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 The Norman Conquest of 1066 is perhaps one of the most debated events in history. 
Because of the outcome of one battle, Hastings, England became more involved in the 
tumultuous political atmosphere of continental Europe; English language and culture became 
forever scarred from French influence; and the kings of England (William, and his descendants, 
the Plantagenets), while ruling their kingdom, would, due to feudal complications, still be 
considered vassals to the King of France as Duke of Normandy. It is not so much the results of 
the Conquest that are debated but the course of the event itself: namely, to explain why William 
won, why Harold lost, and what means were taken by each side. There are many different 
interpretations on the reason for the outcome of Hastings, some of which must be discussed 
briefly.  
 One interpretation, which is widely accepted, holds that William’s brilliant generalship is 
the primary reason for the Norman Victory. David C. Douglas, who adheres to this school of 
thought affirms that “discipline, however, in the last resort, depends upon ultimate command, 
and the more the battle of Hastings is contemplated, the more clearly appears the personal 
contribution of Duke William to the final result.”1 R. Allen Brown, too, affirms this orthodox 
interpretation set down by the nineteenth century historians Freeman and Round: “They [the 
Normans] won, this paper would suggest, amongst other means by superior military techniques 
and by superior generalship.”2 This school has considerable merit, not only from its persistence 
as an orthodox view, but that it is affirmed by many Medievalists of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries. 
 On the contrary, there exists another interpretation which explains the outcome of 
Hastings not as William’s superiority in generalship, but in Harold’s disadvantages. Richard 
Glover, considered the leader of this school, affirms: “the generalship of the Conqueror after his 
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landing at Pevensey must surely appear in a much more creditable light, a light more worthy of 
the man.”3 Furthermore, “the art of war in England is placed upon the road where one would 
expect to find it, a road closely parallel with the progress of the art of war upon the continent,”4 
namely, that the English had at that time a proper cavalry and archers in their military 
institutions, along with a battle-hardened and experienced leader in their king, Harold 
Godwinson. Therefore, William, while a strong leader, may not have been as brilliant as others 
have supposed, and Harold may in fact have been as mighty a leader as William. 
 This paper will explore the reasons for Norman victory. Many contingent factors must be 
explored for a thorough analysis of William’s victory. Several tumultuous events in the years 
prior to the Conquest set the stage for 1066, mainly events that further complicated the issue of 
succession for the English throne. Assessing the organization and preparedness of each side is 
also key to evaluating their respective formidability. Furthermore, the course of Hastings, which 
ultimately determines the Victor, is also essential for an explanation of the Norman victory. At 
the end of this paper it will be apparent that William’s strengths in organization best explains the 
outcome of Hastings, and moreover the Norman Conquest. 
The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle provides a brief account for the year in three manuscripts (C, 
D, and E) which all focus on different areas and aspects of the year AD 1066. D perhaps 
provides the most detailed account, in that it provides sufficient dates, names, and occurrences, 
lacking the insightful analysis. The Chronicle is best used as a sources for chronology of events. 
So too, are the additional sources on the Norman Conquest of England, the most well-known 
being the chronicles of William of Poitiers and Robert Wace. The two, in their respective 
chronicles, while staying true to the events and chronology, romanticize the events in such a way 
that their works may be recited by bards; because of such chroniclers, much of the historical 
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works produced in the Medieval period are a mixture of fact and legend. Therefore, in order to 
produce a more thorough analysis contemporary books and articles will be used as sources for 
this paper. 
The death of St. Edward the Confessor in January of 1066 sparks the fuse of the fateful 
year that would determine the progression of western European history for centuries to come. On 
his deathbed, the Confessor is reported to have named Harold Godwinson, the current Earl of 
Wessex, his heir, to which the Witan, the Anglo-Saxon regal court, approved and elected Harold 
to be king.5 How Harold attained such high status is questionable, and was most likely made 
possible due to the immense influence he had acquired from 1057 to 1064. Harold’s ascension 
angered William, who saw Harold as not only betraying his oath as vassal to the Norman Duchy, 
but also as a usurper of the throne to which he was rightful heir. Also hungry for power, Tostig, 
brother of Harold, aligned himself with Harald Sigurdsson, king of Norway, promising him the 
throne if he could be reinstated in his Earldom at Northumbria, from which he had been exiled 
by Harold. All of these complicated relationships and the political turmoil that was spawned by 
the death of Edward the Confessor must be further explained for an analysis to be made.  
 Harold was the son of the influential Earl of Wessex, Godwin, who was a relative of 
Cnut, the king of England preceding the reign of the Confessor. Tensions between the two 
factions had already been made when Cnut exiled Edward and his brother, Alfred, to Normandy 
in 1028, where they were protected and supported by Duke Robert II, William’s father.6 Alfred, 
deciding to venture to England to claim the throne during a period of instability, was captured by 
Godwin, who sent him to Scandinavia where he was killed. Stemming from this conflict, Edward 
could have had reserved feelings of contempt toward Godwin and his descendants,7 which would 
explain his inclination toward the Norman Duchy, and not the Earl of Wessex. Edward, 
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nonetheless, ascended the throne of England in 1042 as a protégé of Normandy.8 He routed out 
external opposition early on by diverting invasions from Scandinavia, and routed out opposition 
internally by banishing Godwin and his family, who had revolted against the king in 1051.9 He 
naturally was predisposed to Normandy, since Duke Robert had protected him and supported his 
claim to the English throne, as well as sending aid to Edward in order to secure his kingdom.10 
Therefore it makes sense to conclude, as several sources indicate, that Edward had indeed named 
William his heir in 1051, and that Edward additionally held the descendants of Godwin with 
equal disdain due to the murder of his brother.11  
 However, a year later in 1052 Godwin would reestablished himself in his earldom, 
returning from his exile in Flanders, with the help of his sons who sailed from Ireland, Harold 
being among them.12 Consequently, any hope of continuing an Anglo-Norman alliance was then 
lost, and all Norman forces that had been in England were routed out.13 Godwin died the 
following year, after which the Earldom of Wessex passed to Harold.14 Additionally, Tostig, 
Harold’s brother, would receive the Earldom of Northumbria after the death of Earl Siward in 
1055, therefore further increasing the Godwin family’s power and influence in England. In the 
meantime, William had been preoccupied with dissent in his own Dukedom in which he was still 
asserting his power and dominance.15 From 1053 to 1057, Harold’s prestige would only rise, and 
by 1064 it had risen so much “that an annalist could refer to him as ‘under-king’ (sub-
regulus).”16 Due to the change of the status-quo in England during the 1050s, Edward was 
pressured to grant the promise of succession to Harold in William’s stead. 
 In 1064, Harold was sent by Edward to Normandy as an envoy, supposedly to inform 
William of the change in future succession for English Kingship.17 To welcome him, the 
Normans threw him into prison, after which he was brought to William as an honorable guest. 
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Harold then swore an oath as vassal to William to act as his representative in Edward’s court.18 
Being in a rather awkward situation, Harold was forced to submit to William’s demand. He was, 
after all, in Norman territory and surrounded by William’s men; if he refused to make an oath 
they would have most probably killed him. On the other end, William saw Harold’s visit as an 
opportunity to further secure his own succession. Little did he realize Harold had held much 
more influence in England since the rise of the Godwin family in the latter 1050s. With the 
Confessor’s death nearing, Harold only had to bide his time before he would ascend to the 
throne, most likely knowing he would have to fight for legitimacy. 
 One last event sets the stage for the conflict of 1066: Tostig, brother of Harold and Earl 
of Northumbria, was ousted from his own Earldom during a rebellion in 1065, after which he 
fled to Flanders just as his father had fourteen years prior.19 Thus, Harold’s position in England 
was somewhat weakened, as Tostig would eventually become his enemy in the following year. 
However, after Edward’s death, Harold would still inherit the English throne;20 opposition to his 
eventual rule would come overseas, not from within the country. It is still curious that Harold’s 
own brother would play a part in determining the next English king. 
 Thus, as aforementioned, Edward the Confessor would die in January of 1066, with 
Harold crowned hastily after the funeral.21 Both William, who had grounds to claim Harold’s 
ascension as a personal offense, and Harald Sigurdsson, the Norwegian King, began making 
preparations for invasions that would not embark until September of that year.22 Tostig, who 
would return to England in May, aligned himself with Sigurdsson, perhaps with the motivation 
of being restored to his Earldom in Northumbria.23 Thus, the players took the stage in 1066 to 
determine the future of English history and its future role in relation to the rest of the continent. 
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 When considering the fifty years leading up to 1066 it can be ascertained that the realm 
of England was considerably unstable. David C. Douglas explains that “England, albeit 
comprising two ecclesiastical provinces and three great earldoms, was evidently conceived as a 
single kingdom whose political identity must override the differences inherent in the individual 
traditions of its several parts.”24 What is evident is that England was divisive at this point in 
history. At the time of his death, the Confessor was firmly established in his regal territory; 
however, with the Godwin family controlling much of England, along with Morcar assuming 
power in Northumbria in Tostig’s stead, there was much tension, as well as little that the 
Confessor could do.25 His Earls passively rivaled one another for succession, for Harold would 
not have ventured to Normandy in 1065 if he did not wish to win regal favor. Even before the 
1060s, Edward had many problems involving Godwin and his sons disregarding his influence in 
1051 and forcing their way out of exile in 1052. He also had to force his way onto his own 
throne after the death of Cnut, the previous king, in 1042. Therefore, it is evident that the 
political atmosphere in Anglo-Saxon England was not ideal for organizing under one banner. As 
Douglas affirms, it consisted of several separate Earldoms, all superficially under one kingdom. 
 The military organization of Anglo-Saxon England was deeply rooted in the Germanic 
culture from which it came.26 Each Earl has his own personal force of housecarls, the Anglo-
Saxon elite infantry, as well as a system of calling up trained soldiers for campaigns which were 
typically ordered by the king.27 In times of emergency in which foreign invasion was imminent, 
a fyrd was called, in which five representatives from five nearby hides would meet an invading 
force in the battle field; this is what the learned Professor Hollister calls the select fyrd.28 The 
other type, which he calls the great fyrd, was comprised of all freemen of a particular region 
who, poorly armed, would meet an invading force, usually coming from the sea.29 This great 
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fyrd was called to combat the many Viking Invasions of England, as well as Harold’s return from 
Ireland in 1052.30 Thanes were another trained force in the Anglo-Saxon military, perhaps the 
equivalent of French and Norman knights.31 It has been suggested by the learned Richard Glover 
that “the weapons and equipment of the amoured men on the two sides are almost precisely the 
same,” therefore concluding that the Anglo-Saxons had a proper cavalry at their disposal.32 
However, he relies too heavily on Snorri Sturluson’s saga, Heimskringla, and is also dismissive 
of the broad variety of William’s force.33 Furthermore, Hollister, in critiquing Glover’s 
argument, points out his inconsistency in terminology for who consists of the supposed Anglo-
Saxon cavalry. Glover seems to conclude that the housecarls made up the Anglo-Saxon cavalry, 
but in other places refers to the Old English term cniht, which translates to knight.34 Hollister 
shows Glover is contradictory and unclear here, for he could be referring to the fyrd as a cavalry 
force, which is unlikely since the fyrd had no formal training period.35  
 In regards to Hastings, Glover claims that “the new army which Harold sought to scrape 
together… could only be raised from a country already stripped of the materials of which armies 
were to be made.”36 When considering the organization of both the select and great fyrds 
presented by Hollister, Glover’s assessment seems to be lacking in information. The fyrd that 
Harold would have called in the North to combat Sigurdsson would have been a different force 
than the one he called in the South to combat William, because the organization of the fyrd was 
regionally based, as evidenced earlier. Harold was able to muster a fyrd force quickly upon 
arriving at Hastings for the purposes of defense, which he added to his own force of housecarls, 
amounting to around 5,000 men in total.37 The whole country would not have been entirely 
stripped of its resources. Hastings was also one of the longest battles in the Medieval period, 
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lasting about twelve hours in total; therefore, Harold’s force could not have been so bereft of 
men and supplies if they could contend with the Normans for half a day. 
 As a whole, Harold’s force mostly consisted of infantry, with his housecarls focused in 
the center, and light-armored fyrd forces and some archers on either flank.38 Additionally, the 
infantry maintained a shield wall in the front of their force, which Harold positioned on a hill 
near Hastings.39 Due to such a defensive position, without the cavalry that Glover insists on, it 
may have been the case that Harold did not seek to defeat William; he may have only wanted to 
hold William off until reinforcements could come. William, on the other hand, clearly sought to 
destroy Harold’s army, which was the only thing that stood between him and London.  
 Therefore, Norman forces and organization prove that William was both determined and 
cautious about his invasion of England. From an early age the task of proving his own mettle was 
set before William, from which he did not shy away. From 1040, when he had just came of age, 
to 1060, he grew in power and influence in Normandy by routing out opposition, and 
establishing a court of close friends and advisers in whom he could place trust.40 Certain 
instances came in which he would rival the Capetian King of France, Henry I, who would align 
himself with rebellious barons within William’s hold.41 However, after Philip I rose to the 
Capetian throne in 1060 at the age of eight, William would no longer have tense issues involving 
the King, which perhaps allowed him to prepare as much as he did for his conquest of England.42 
Through his dealing with internal issues during the early years of his reign, William proved 
himself as a formidable strategic leader and also ensured the stability of his duchy, allowing him 
to effectively organize in 1066.  
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 This process of organization is one that conveys both William’s caution in contending 
with Harold, whom he most likely considered to be a formidable opponent, as well as his own 
ambition for attaining an inheritance which, in his mind, had been usurped by a traitor. William’s 
force consisted of about 10,000-14,000 men,43 which he transported with approximately 700 
ships, 100 to 150 of which had most likely been of Byzantine design.44 Out of the estimated 
number of men, a third of the total was cavalry, along with another significant portion of infantry 
archers.45 William had also gathered a large amount of mercenary forces from all over Northern 
Europe; after all, his “force at Hastings,” as Hollister attests, “was by no means a typical Norman 
army.”46 William maintained this highly organized and varying army together the summer of 
1066 on the shores of Northern France, during which time he relocated from Dives to Saint-
Valery and waited through inclement weather for the right conditions to cross the channel swiftly 
and safely.47 This delay in crossing proved to be an unexpected advantage for the Duke of 
Normandy, since Harold, who had been focused on defending his shores from an impending 
Norman invasion for the majority of the summer, had to travel North to battle the Norwegian 
King.48 Godwinson defeated Sigurdsson and Tostig at Stamford Bridge on 25 September, after 
which he marched hastily South with his remaining troops to mount a defense against William.49 
Thus, William would land at Pevensey unopposed on the morning of 28 September 1066.50 
 William crossed with the Norman army for the purposes of conquest, not of pillaging. He 
would not have conscripted such a formidable force, built ships of special, foreign design, or 
built fortifications upon landing51 if he had no intention of conquest and, afterward, permanent 
establishment. In addition, William also waited for Harold to come to him, perhaps a cautious 
move on the Duke’s part. This wariness may reveal the respect that William had for his 
opponent. However, when Harold’s force arrived in the vicinity of Hastings and had hastily 
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established itself on high ground, William moved towards the Anglo-Saxon army, capitalizing on 
the opportunity of contending with a battle-weary and unorganized opponent.52  
 Almost all sources indicate that William made great use of his cavalry and archers during 
the course of Hastings (14 October 1066).53 He conducted feigned retreats with his infantry 
down the hill, in an attempt to lure the Anglo-Saxons towards the hill’s base, at which point his 
cavalry would trample over the English infantrymen who had fallen into the trap.54 The greatest 
mistakes for the Anglo-Saxons was their pursuit of these feigned retreats from their defensive 
position. If they had not, the course of the battle may have gone more in their favor. As for 
William and the Normans, they succeeded in making use of the variety of their army: the 
infantry conducted the feigned retreats; the archers would send follies of arrows into the air 
towards the defenders on the hill;55 and the cavalry would trample on the Anglo-Saxon 
infantrymen who had so foolishly pursued the retreating Norman infantry. During the course of 
the battle, Harold was killed; the Bayeux Tapestry and other contemporary sources depict him 
being shot in the eye with an arrow and trampled underfoot by Norman cavalry.56 Douglas 
speculates that Harold was killed by an arrow during one of the Norman follies.57 After his death, 
the Norman forces took the defensive position, and by then it was nighttime; the battle was 
over.58 The Normans were victorious. 
 The outcome of Hastings is best explained through Norman victory. It is true that Harold 
had many disadvantages going into the battle, as he had made a swift march from Stamford 
Bridge to Hastings in less than a month. It is also rather unusual for so many major battles to be 
fought in so short a period of time, especially for the medieval period.59 The size of the battles is 
also unique.60 However, William, who had participated in his second battle with Hastings,61 
proved to be the better leader, and the Normans a more formidable force. As evidenced, he 
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conscripted his force from all over Normandy and Western Europe, he kept said force together 
from summer into fall during a period of inclement weather which delayed their crossing, he 
prepared diligently for Harold by building fortifications at Pevensey and Hastings, and finally he 
made great use of the variety of professional soldiers he had at his disposal. Harold still did 
prove to be a formidable opponent; if he had not, the battle would not have lasted for half a day. 
It was William who succeeded both strategically and tactically, capitalizing upon every 
opportunity that was presented to him, with which he could barely win in the end after twelve 
hours.  
 William would be crowned at Westminster Abbey on Christmas Day 1066, after which 
he would spend his reign pacifying the countryside and routing out opposition, just as he had 
done during his youth in Normandy. Thenceforth, England would become more closely tied with 
the political atmosphere of the continent. William’s descendants, the Plantagenets, would have to 
deal with the paradox of feudalism that was now in place: they would be vassal to the Capetian 
King of France on the continent, while King of England on the great isle.  
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